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Criminal Penalties for Vagrancy-Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth
Amendment?

A

recent judicial pronouncements, treatment of a
narcotics addict1 or a chronic alcoholic2 as a criminal may violate the eighth amendment prohibition3 against cruel and unusual
punishment. Such decisions have raised serious constitutional questions concerning the punishment of persons having a "status" similar
to drug addiction or alcoholism. Thus, it is reasonable to inquire
whether the punishment of persons for vagrancy or related crimes
of personal condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment While it is dear that the amendment
now applies to the states as well as to the federal government,4 the
Supreme Court has failed to provide any distinct standards for applying its proscription to other crimes.
This Note will therefore discuss vagrancy laws as they exist
today, and an attempt will be made to formulate constitutional
guidelines for applying the cruel and unusual punishment clause in
conjunction with the existing standards applicable to the crime of
vagrancy. In addition, the inadequacies and abuses of vagrancy
laws will be shown as a basis for proposed alternative methods for
dealing with the problem.
CCORDING TO

I.

A.

BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME OF VAGRANCY

Purposes and Descriptionof Vagrancy

The nature of the crime of vagrancy can be more easily understood by examining the purposes for its existence. Vagrancy statutes are derived from English laws which were designed to prevent
worker migration, as well as to prevent crimes and supplement laws
regulating the poor by forcing idle persons to work. It is generally
agreed that such laws exist today primarily as crime-preventive measures; the other purposes are merely historical.5 Basically, it is pre1 Robinson

v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

2 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

But see Budd v.

California, 385 U.S. 909 (1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
s U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
4

1For a discussion of this expansion, see note 51 infra and accompanying text.
5 Ledwith v. Roberts, 1 K.B. 232, 270-77 (CA. 1936). See generally 3 STEPMN,
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sumed that anyone who can be classified as a vagrant is likely to
commit a future criminal act from which society should be protected.6 It is generally thought that "a vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of the [vagrancyl statute is to prevent crimes
which may likely flow from his mode of life."7
At common law any able-bodied person who traveled from
place to place with no visible means of support was considered idle,
and one who refused to work for his maintenance was deemed a
vagrant.' The common law definition of vagrancy is no longer of
much importance because it is now a statutory offense in virtually
every state in the country. However, in a few states where the
term vagrant is used without having been defined, the common law
definition remains important."0 In addition to being made a crime
A

HISTORY OF TE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

266-75 (1883); Perkins, The Va-

grancy Concept, 9 HASrINGS I-. 237 (1958).
6 Modern courts and legislatures are frank in their recognition that vagrancy statutes
are aimed at the potential criminal. See, e.g., Ex parte Karnstrom, 297 Mo. 384, 394,
249 S.W. 595, 597 (1923); State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 771, 175 P.2d 633, 637
(1946).
7
It is generally thought that "a vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of
the [vagrancy) statute is to prevent crimes which may likely flow from his mode of
life." District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also
authorities cited note 5 supra.
8 People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App. Dec. Supp. 778, 296 Pac. 601 (Super. Ct. 1931);
People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934); Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va.
526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
9
ALA. CODE tit. 14, 5 437 (Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. § 11.60.210 (1962);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 13-991 to -993 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4301 to
-4303 (1964); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-8-19 to -20 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §5 53-336 to -340 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. ti.11, 55 881-93 (1953); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-3302 to -3306 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.02 (1965); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-7001 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws 55 314-1 to -7 (Supp. 1961);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7101 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. 55 10-4602 to -4603 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 746.1-.2 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 21-2409 (1963); KY. REV.
STAT. §§ 204.060,436.520-.530 (1963); LA. REv. STAT. § 14.107 (Supp. 1965); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 3751 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 490, 581 (1957);
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, §§ 63-69 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.364 (1962);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2666 (1942); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563-340 (1959); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. 5 94-35-248 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1115 to -1119 (1943); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 207.030 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570:25 (Supp. 1959); N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 2A:170-1, -8 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 887-91 (Supp.
1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-336 to -341 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-04
(1960); OHio REV. CODE § 715.55, 2923.28; OKLA. STAT. tit.21, § 1141 (1961); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 166.060 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2032 (1963); R-I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 11-45-1, -3, -10, -11, 14-1-4 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-565 (1962); S.D.
CODE § 13.1424 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4701 (1955); TEx PEN. CODE art.
607 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. 55 76-19-10, -61-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
3901 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63-337 to -338 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010
(Supp. 1966); WIS. STAT. § 947.02 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. 6-221 (1957).
10 See In re Jordon, 90 Mich. 3, 50 N.W. 1087 (1892). City of Huntington v.
Saylor, 135 W. Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (1951); cf. People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y. 330, 199
N.E. 501 (1936).
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by state statute, vagrancy may also be made unlawful by municipal
ordinance.11 While the scope of the crime varies according to the
statute or ordinance in question, it may include living in idleness
with no visible means of support 2 or being a common prostitute,"16
15
common drunkard,' common gambler, common street beggar,
common thief," or any suspicious person who cannot give a reasonable account of himself. 8 Certain acts or failures to act may
also constitute vagrancy - for example, wandering or loitering by
a member of a certain class or in a certain place,'" begging, ° lodging or sleeping outdoors,2 ' failure to support one's family,22 and
being a disorderly person.2
The term "vagrancy" will be used here in a broad sense so as
to include all types of vagrancy offenses.24 It should be emphasized,
however, that there are two general categories of vagrancy crimes:
first, those in which proof of a certain status is required and, second,
those in which an act or failure to act constitutes vagrancy. In both
cases the crime is usually a misdemeanor punishable by fines or im25
prisonment or both.
Crimes are traditionally defined in terms of committing an act
11 See City of New Orleans v. Postek, 180 La. 1048, 158 So. 533 (1934). In Ohio,
municipalities are expressly given the power to punish vagrancy. OHIO REV. CODE §
715.55. In West Virginia, where vagrancy is not a statutory crime, municipal charters
sometimes confer the power to punish it. City of Huntington v. Saylor, supra note 10.
12 This is the common law vagrant and refers to "those hangers-on of society, ne'erdo-wells, loafers who stand about our street comers and public places without any
visible means of employment and refuse to work when employment can be had." People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y. 330, 333, 199 NE. 501, 502 (1936). See also D.C. CODE ANN.
5 22-3302 (1961).
13A woman who habitually engages in indiscriminate acts of prostitution. E.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302 (1961); WAsit. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (Supp. 1966).
14
An idle or dissolute person who is habitually intoxicated. E.g., MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.364 (Supp. 1965).
15
E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302(5) (1961).
1' E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302 (1961).
17
E.g., N.Y. CODE CIM. PRoc. § 887.
18
E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302 (1961); N.Y. CODE CEIM. PRoc. § 887.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22
E.g., McH. STAT. ANN. § 28.364 (Supp. 1965).
23 Ibid.
24 For a more complete discussion of the scope and statutory definitions of the
crime of vagrancy in the United States, see Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203, 1206-09 (1953); Perkins, supra note 5; Note,
37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 102, 108-16 (1962).
25
E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. 5 22-3304 (1961); Mic-L STAT. ANN. § 28.365 (1962);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 901.
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or failing to act, but vagrancy tends to punish a person for his condition rather than for acts which he has committed. Thus, vagrancy
laws punish a state of being or a present "status." Courts frequently
state that the essential element of this type of crime is that the accused must have the "status" defined by the statute.2" However,
this may mean that having a certain personal condition, as evidenced
by visible or physical facts or "acts," is a crime. One single act or
omission is generally not sufficient to support a presumption that
an individual is an habitual thief or a common drunkard because a
course of conduct is normally required to prove such a condition.
Interestingly, no single act necessary to prove the vagrancy status
need be criminal, for one such act is not detrimental to society but
a continued course of conduct by an individual who begs or loiters
may be damaging.
B.

Constitutionalityof a Vagrancy Charge

Because there are distinctions between traditional crimes of action and crimes of condition, vagrancy laws lend themselves to attack on several constitutional grounds. Most often they have been
challenged for being unconstitutionally vague' or as excessively
restrictive of personal liberty. 9 Clear and precise language in
penal statutes is a requirement of due process." Statutes creating
crimes of personal condition are often either vague in defining the
offense so that a defendant may not be aware of the accusation
against him or so broad that police may easily abuse their wide discretion in enforcement. In some cases the courts have found statutes unconstitutional for vagueness, 1 but most often they have been
upheld.
26 See Brooks v. State, 34 So. 2d 175 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948); Bower v. State, 135
N.J.L. 564, 53 A.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1947); City of Columbus v. Alrich, 69 Ohio App.
396,2 742 N.E.2d 915 (1942); State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 24 P.2d 601 (1933).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 179 Mass. 533, 534, 61 N-E. 213, 214
(1901); Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 177, 192, 138 S.W. 759, 766 (1911).
28
Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939); People v. Belcastro, 356 M1.144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
29 State v. Starr, 57 Ariz. 270, 113 P.2d 356 (1941); State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d
764, 175 P.2d 663 (1946) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 748 (1947);
Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S- 327 (1920).
30 [A) statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process law." Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See also Baggetr v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964). For a complete discussion of the problem, see Note, Due Process Requirements
of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L. R-Ev. 77 (1948).
3 1 E.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d
786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960).
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The other primary constitutional ground is that crimes of vagrancy violate due process as unreasonable restraints on personal
liberty. This charge usually relates to those clauses of the statutes
pertaining to loitering, roaming without reason, idleness, and assodating with known or reputed criminals. Nevertheless, the courts
have generally upheld these statutes.3" In addition, it has been
suggested that vagrancy statutes create unreasonable classifications
in violation of the equal protection clause 3 or that, as a crime of
status or condition, a person might be repeatedly punished contrary
to the prohibition against double jeopardy. 4 However, there are
apparently no cases in which either of the latter two grounds have
been supported.
In only a few isolated cases and with almost no success has a
vagrancy statute been attacked on the ground that it violated the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment."
Yet it must be noted that the concept of cruel and unusual punishment has undergone significant development since these decisions.
The Supreme Court held in Robinson v. Californias that classification and punishment of a person as a criminal for the status of
drug addiction is unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Subsequently, two federal circuit courts adopted a
similar view and extended the Robinson concept of cruel and unusual punishment to prohibit similar punishment of a chronic alcoholic.37 Thus, the cruel and unusual punishment clause may now
be utilized to prohibit any punishment whatsoever of certain personal conditions which were once made criminal by statute."
An
examination of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment as it
exists today will aid in determining whether penal statutes on vagrancy impose an unconstitutionally cruel punishment.
32
E.g., State v. Starr, 57 Ariz. 270, 113 P.2d 356 (1941); New Orleans v. Postek,
180 La. 1047, 158 So. 553 (1934). Contra, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
33
State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio S. 202, 58 N.E. 572 (1900).
34
State v. Flynn, 16 R.I. 10, 11 Ad. 170 (1887).
85 E.g., Stoutenburg v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (D.C. Cir. 1900); State v. Hogan,
63 Ohio St 202, 58 N.E. 572 (1900).
36 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
37
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant,
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
38
Previously, the eighth amendment was invoked only to prohibit cruel methods or
excessive punishments. See text accompanying notes 39-49 infra.
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II. THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
A.

Historical Background

The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment was adopted originally to prevent the government from
imposing punishments of a barbaric and inhumane nature."9 Before Robinson v. California," the cruel and unusual punishment
restriction had been imposed, first, to prohibit inherently cruel
methods of punishment and, second, to prevent cruelly excessive
punishments which were disproportionate to the crime committed.
Historically, punishments which were cruel and unusual because of the method employed included burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, quartering, solitary confinement, and
denationalization. 4 Current methods of punishment which might
arguably be included within this classification are whipping,42 sterilization,4" the death penalty,44 and barring a convicted felon from
holding public office. 45 While it can be argued that every form of
punishment involves some cruelty, the eighth amendment extends
only to methods which violate those "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."4
The second category includes those punishments which are excessively cruel in relation to the crime committed. In Weems v.
United States47 the Supreme Court stated by way of dictum that excessiveness as well as the mode of punishment may be unconstitutionally cruel. The Court noted that "it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
39 See Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 801 (1947). For a thorough treatment of the cases and background of the eighth
amendment, see Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of
Cruel and UnusualPunishment, 36 N.Y.U.L REV. 846 (1961).
40 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
41 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890)
(dictum).
42 In State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963), the imposition of lashes as a penalty for the commission of a crime was upheld by Delaware's highest court.
43
Sterilization has been held constitutional by some courts but not by others.
Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126
Pac. 75 (1912).
44
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (dictum); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
447 (1890) (dictum).
45 See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 638 (1966).
46
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
47 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

19671

CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VAGRANCY

1315

[the] offense."4 8 However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant
since lWeems to impose restrictions against excessive punishments,
following instead a policy of leaving such determinations to the
discretion of the individual states.49
B.

The Implications of Robinson v. California

The most recent Supreme Court expression against cruel and
0 where the
unusual punishment came in Robinson v. California,"
Court further expanded the eighth amendment's scope by holding
that the status of narcotics addiction cannot be made a crime. Robinson is significant not only because it is the first decision in which
the Supreme Court unequivocally applied the eighth amendment to
the states through the fourteenth amendment 1 but also because it
marked the first occasion that the Court utilized the cruel and unusual punishment clause to invalidate a legislative attempt to define a criminal offense. In addition to abandoning its previous
practice of not interfering with the states' discretion to impose criminal penalties, the Court, in effect, also restricted the states' power
to define what constitutes a crime."
Robinson has caused considerable comment and speculation as
to what constitutional guidelines should now govern the courts in
applying the eighth amendment to other crimes. 8 This is largely
due to the difficulty encountered in attempting to determine the
precise rationale for the Court's holding. Arguably, Robinson provides no authority for the courts to extend the eighth amendment
to prohibit punishment of other crimes. Mr. Justice Stewart stated
48 Id. at 367.
49

See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting in decision to deny
certiorari); Louisiana ex rel. Brands v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1947) (concurring opinion).
50 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
51
The old line of reasoning was established by It re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)
which held that the fourteenth amendment does not make the eighth amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applicable to the states. In Louisiana ex rel.
Frands v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947), the Court assumed that the fourteenth
amendment applied the eighth amendment to the states, but this assumpion was unnecessary to the decision.
52
Previously, the eighth amendment was invoked only to prohibit cruel methods
of punishments or excessive punishments. For a discussion of this application, see text
accompanying notes 39-49 supra.
53
See, e.g., Budd v. California, 385 U.S. 909 (1966) (denying certiorari from Ninth
Circuit); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (eighth amendment forbids
criminal punishment of the chronic alcoholic for public intoxication). See also Logan,
May a Man Be Punished Because He Is I1?, 52 A.B.A.J. 932 (1966); Note, 79 HARV.
L REv. 635 (1966).
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at the dose of the majority opinion that "we deal in this case only
with an individual provision of a particularized local law as it has
so far been interpreted by the California courts."54
However, a careful reading of Robinson suggests several criteria upon which the Court relied in arriving at its holding. The
Supreme Court's silence on eighth amendment questions since Robinson provides little help in making this determination. Thus,
while the majority of the Court probably intended its decision to
apply only to that immediate factual situation, it can be argued that
the rationales relied upon can be judicially extended to prohibit
punishment of crimes similar in nature to narcotics addiction. Indeed, Robinson provided a "legal springboard" for the Fourth Circuit to hold in Driver v. Hinnant" that punishment of a chronic
alcoholic for public intoxication is cruel and unusual and thus violates the eighth amendment. An analysis of the possible rationales
in Robinson might therefore be of some assistance in determining
whether penalties imposed for crimes of vagrancy violate the eighth
amendment. If the same criteria applied by the Court to drug addiction can be applied by analogy to vagrancy, there is a sound basis
for making this consideration.
C. Rationales of Robinson v. California
(1) Status or Condition.-The first rationale suggested by
Robinson is that the criminal law cannot punish a mere status or
condition; only acts may be made criminal. This criterion can be
deduced from the holding that the status or condition of being a
drug addict cannot be made a criminal offense for which the offender can be prosecuted prior to his reformation."6 The fact that
unlawful acts are committed before a person is legally classified a
drug addict does not defeat this rationale. The Court stated in its
opinion that while a state may punish the use, sale, or possession of
narcotics, it cannot punish a person for merely being a drug addict."v
Nor can a state declare that a person having a particular status is
continuously guilty of an offense when he may never have committed an unlawful "act" within that state. In Robinson, therefore,
the state of California was not permitted to punish a person for
54 370 U.S. at

668.
5 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
56
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
67 Id. at 664, 666-67.

19671

CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VAGRANCY

1317

addiction alone, absent proof that he committed a criminal act of
use, sale, or possession of narcotics within the state."8
The crime of vagrancy has long been recognized as a crime of
"status." 9 It is almost universally accepted in American jurisdictions that a person may be convicted for vagrancy without committing any otherwise criminal act.6" The purpose of vagrancy statutes
is not to punish the person for doing overt acts; it is rather to prevent crimes which may flow from a vagrant's mode of life.6 Therefore, the accepted rationale that punishment of a status is cruel and
unusual under the eighth amendment can readily be applied to vagrancy laws. Since most vagrancy laws do not require proof of
mens tea" or of the commission of any overt acts, they punish the
mere status of a person who may never have committed an unlawful
"act" within the state where he is convicted. Under the status rationale, acts which may have been committed before the individual
becomes a vagrant should not be sufficient justification for treating
him as a criminal for his present status. Under this rationale, a
state would be justified in punishing a vagrant for criminal conduct
which creates his status or arises from his status but not for the status
or condition itself.
(2) Illness or Disease.-Arguably, the status theory exceeds
the language of Robinson since it requires a broad reading of the
case. The Court was careful to focus attention on the concept that
addiction is really an illness or disease which might be innocently
or involuntarily contracted.63 Thus, a second rationale is presented,
namely, that a state cannot punish a person for having an illness
or a disease. This theory is supported by the Court's examples of
other illnesses which cannot be treated as criminal offenses:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
58 Ibjd.
59 For a discussion of this term, see notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.

60
E.g., District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1947), where the
court stated: "A vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of the statute is to prevent crimes which may likely flow from his mode of life." Id. at 835. See also State
v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 197 At. 360 (Ct Err. & App. 1938).
61
District of Columbia v. Hunt, supra note 60, at 835. Nevertheless, it must be
recognized that certain types of vagrants, for example, the common drunkard or common prostitute, have committed some acts in order to achieve their present status. It
is the continued commission of such acts which vagrancy laws seek to prevent, but it is
often questionable whether having the status itself is sufficient legal justification for
imposing penal sanctions without proof of unlawful acts.
62
Mens rea may be defined as a criminal intent or a wrongful purpose. BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
63 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally
ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease .... [1]n
the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
in
64
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas went to great length in his concurring
opinion to justify treating a narcotics addict as a sick person and
not as a criminal. 6 5
Under the "illness" rationale it is more difficult to argue that
punishment of a person for vagrancy constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment because vagrancy dearly is not a physical or mental
disease. However, vagrancy does have some characteristics which
are similar to addiction. The drug addict feels compelled to continue his habit and can be cured only through intensive medical
care. While a vagrant might overcome his plight more easily by
obtaining a job to support himself, he too may feel compelled to
continue his idle existence. He may be a victim of socioeconomic
conditions and a poor environment and may need guidance or temporary welfare relief. It seems sound to say, therefore, that the vagrant also needs to be treated through rehabilitation of some kind.
In Robinson it was suggested that a state could establish a program
for compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics in order to
better the general health and welfare." Perhaps a similar program
would be in order for "treatment" of vagrants.
(3) Involuntariness.-The "illness" rationale lends itself to a
more tenable reading of Robinson but was probably not the sole
criterion that the Court used. It was not the mere imprisonment
of the addict which was condemned as cruel; it was imprisoning
him because he was an addict.6 " A distinction must be drawn between punishing a person who has an illness for the commission of
some crime and punishing him for having the illness although he
has not been convicted of any other crime. The fact that the Court
stated that penal sanctions might be imposed against the addict for
failure to comply with compulsory treatment effected through civil
confinement 8 supports the conclusion that Robinson was directed
against criminal treatment for having an illness.
64 1d. at 666.

65 Id. at
66 Id. at
67 Id. at
68 Id. at

668-75.

665.
667.
665.
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Furthermore, there is a question of whether the Court meant to
impose restraints only against the punishment for a personal condition innocently or involuntarily acquired. Thus, the third rationale
suggested is that a person may not be treated as a criminal for having a status for which he is not responsible. The "involuntariness"
rationale is supported by the Court's statement that addiction is "an
illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily,"69 and
by Mr. Justice Douglas' observation that "the first step toward addiction may
be as innocent as a boy's puff on a cigarette in an alley'7 0
way.

Vagrancy laws would not seem to fall within the "involuntariness" rationale because most vagrants voluntarily acquire their
status. 7 ' Those persons who become vagrants involuntarily are in
the minority and usually are the victims of periods of high unemployment.
In the final analysis, the "involuntariness" concept is nearly
impossible to apply since it requires an inquiry into each individual
case. In addition, it does not result from a logical reading of Robinson in light of the consideration that an addict at some point usually has a choice as to whether or not he will succumb to the habit.
The Court did not restrict punishment to voluntary addicts but instead prohibited punishment of any addict, whether his addiction
was involuntary or not.
There can be no assurance that any of the three rationales suggested here can be applied by the courts to decide eighth amendment questions. While it can be concluded that the Court limited
the states' discretion in defining crimes by preventing them from
treating addiction as a crime, only further refinement by the Supreme Court in future decisions can extend the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment to other crimes.
III.

NoNcRIMINAL TREATmENT OF OTHER
PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

It is significant that there are conditions or statuses other than
vagrancy which are not treated by existing law as criminal offenses.
For various reasons, modern society has seen fit to deal with these
conditions in other ways. An examination will be made here of
drug addiction, chronic alcoholism, insanity, and homosexuality.
69 Id.at 667.
70 Id. at 670.
71 See Note, supra note 53, at 651.
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None of these conditions is treated as a crime, and a person having
such a condition generally can be punished only for unlawful conduct. In some cases the condition or "disease" may serve as a defense, thereby excusing the individual for his conduct. If vagrancy
can be likened to any of these statuses, the argument for including
vagrancy laws within the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment would be stronger. It is possible that a better method of
dealing with vagrancy would be to punish only unlawful "conduct"
or, even more liberally, to make the status a defense to otherwise
criminal conduct.
Narcotics Addiction

A.

Robinson v. Californi7 2 dearly established that an individual
cannot be punished for having the condition or status of drug addiction. However, an addict can be convicted on a criminal charge
for the use, possession, or sale of narcotics." Thus, while a state
may not treat narcotics addiction as a crime, it may make criminal
the acts or conduct arising out of or causing the status. Undoubtedly,
the holding in Robinson was influenced by a strong body of medical
science which equates drug addiction with a disease or illness.74
Since the Robinson75 rationale cannot be precisely determined, it
can only be said for certain that it is cruel and unusual punishment
to treat a person as a criminal for being a drug addict.
Depending upon the rationale adopted, a broad interpretation
of Robinson might extend the eighth amendment to prohibit the
punishment of a person for being a vagrant.7 6 By the same token,
the unlawful conduct or acts which cause or arise from the status of
vagrancy would be criminally treated.77
Chronic Alcoholism

B.

In Driver v. Hinnant" the Fourth Circuit recently held that
72 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
78
74

Id. at 664.
See, e.g., Report on Narcotic Addiction, 165 A.M.A.J. 1707 (1957); Lindesmith,

The British System of Narcotics Control, 22 LAW & CONTEMP.
75

PROB.

138 (1957).

This deficiency is discussed in text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
76 A more detailed discussion of this interpretation may be found in text accompanying notes 56-70 supra.
77 Since the Court sanctioned criminal punishments for the use, possession, and
sale of narcotics in Robinson, an extension of the rule to include vagrancy would punish
unlawful acts or conduct arising from the status.
78 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
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punishing a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness is unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The court
9 stating that chronic alrelied heavily on Robinson v. California,7
coholism is similar to drug addiction in that it also can be considered a disease or illness."0 Thus, a state cannot punish an individual
for an involuntary symptom (public intoxication) of a status any
more than it can punish him for a status (drug addiction) involuntarily assumed. The case is summarized in the words of Judge
Bryan: "The upshot of our decision is that the state cannot stamp
an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease.""1
The Driver case is dearly an extension of the principle enunciated in Robinson regarding the proscription of cruel and unusual
punishments. In Driver the alcoholic was not being punished for
his status as the drug addict was in Robinson; rather, he was being
punished for an act or "symptom" arising from his status. The
offense of public drunkenness is the commission of an act, thereby
distinguishing it from the crime of narcotics addiction which is defined in terms of being a particular status. The court in Driver
seems to have adopted the "involuntariness" rationale, 2 noting
that public intoxication is an involuntary symptom of the status of
chronic alcoholism. Since Driver, one other circuit has adopted
the same view." In October 1966, however, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Budd v. California4 which presented a similar question. Thus, the constitutionality of punishing
a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication is still open to debate.
Vagrancy crimes are generally characterized by punishing the
status itself. They have the unusual feature of justifying criminal
sanctions on the mere possibility that a criminal act may be committed by a person falling within the prescribed class.8 5 As such,
they are similar to statutes punishing public intoxication which have
as their underlying purpose the safety and protection of the public.8 "
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
80 356 F.2d at 765. In comparing Robison the court stated: "he California
statute criminally punished a 'status' - drug addiction - involuntarily assumed; the
North Carolina Act criminally punished an involuntary symptom of a status - public
intoxication." Id. at 764-65.
81 Id. at 765.
82
For an analysis of this rationale, see text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
8
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
84 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
8
5E.g., District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
86 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). "It is well within the State's
79
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The crime-preventive purpose which presently justifies treating the
status of vagrancy as a crime is questionable in light of Driver.
That case's extension of the "status" principle set forth in Robinson
so as to encompass the involuntary symptoms of the status goes even
further than an extension of the same rule would have to go in order to prohibit punishment of the status of vagrancy itself. Of
course, it must be realized that unlike alcoholism, vagrancy is not
generally considered to be an illness nor is it necessarily an involuntary status. Perhaps these distinctions should be weighed against
the crime-preventive purpose of vagrancy laws in order to determine whether vagrancy warrants the same protections illnesses receive.
C. Insanity
The insane person who commits a criminal act is no longer
treated as a criminal; instead, he is recognized as a mentally sick
person who should receive medical and psychiatric care and rehabilitation. He cannot be criminally punished for an act committed
while he was legally insane, although the same act would constitute
a crime if done by a sane person."7 The underlying theory behind
the defense of insanity is that a crime requires an act with intent
and that an insane person cannot legally be guilty of any criminal
intent."8 It has also been said that from the standpoint of moral
guilt, the insane person is outside the postulate of the legal theory
of punishment.8 " In Robinson v. California0 the Court discussed
the inhumanity of punishing an insane person in order to illustrate
the cruelty of treating one with an illness as a criminal." The
Court concluded that it is just as illogical to treat a drug addict as
a criminal.
The underlying reason for the Court's analogy in Robinson between insanity and drug addiction is not apparent, although the
important factor for making insanity a defense to criminal acts is
the lack of criminal intent. Yet this principle does not necessarily
power and right to deter and punish public drunkenness, especially to secure others
against its annoyances and intrusions." Id. at 765.
87 See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836
(1949); State v. Pinski, 163 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1942).
88
Handspike v. State, 203 Ga. 115, 45 S.E.2d 662 (1947); State v. Cooper, 170
N.C. 719, 87 S.E. 50 (1915); State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641 (1909).
89
E.g., Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
90 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

91 Id.at 666.
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apply to the drug addict. While a drug addict may feel compelled
to commit a criminal act to support his habit, he may still have
the requisite criminal intent. The most important distinction to
be made is that insanity serves as a defense to any criminal act,92
whereas addiction, although a status which cannot be made synonymous with a criminal act,93 cannot be relied upon as a defense to
other criminal acts. The insanity defense is similar to the treatment
of chronic alcoholism as a defense to public intoxication in Driver
v. Hinnant.4 In both cases, the status served as a defense to an
otherwise unlawful act which arose from the status.
It is difficult to compare the condition of insanity with vagrancy
because the latter is not a disease or illness. Nevertheless, if it is
considered that the Robinson Court relied on the analogous insanity
defense theory to support its holding, it can be argued that the vagrant has no more criminal intent than does the drug addict. Therefore, the vagrant should not be treated as a criminal for his mere
status.
D. Homosexuality
The homosexual or sexual psychopath is not punished for his
status under the present law because only homosexual "acts" are
considered criminal. No state makes homosexuality a crime, but
nearly all prohibit an interrelated series of homosexual acts, usually
under the name of sodomy or crimes against nature." Many of
these laws punish not only homosexual acts but also taboo heterosexual ones and sexual contacts with animals." It is significant to
note that the important element in punishing the homosexual is the
"act," and even this approach has been criticized by several authorities." Although there appears to be no direct relationship between
vagrancy and homosexuality, there are some similarities. Both are
personal statuses or conditions which are likely to result in some
unlawful conduct.
The approach which the law takes with regard to homosexuals
92 State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473,478, 121 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1961).
93

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
94 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
95

For a thorough discussion of the laws which deal with the homosexual offender,

see Bowman & Engle, PsychiatricEvaluation of the Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEMP.
LQ. 273 (1956); Glueck, An Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L

REv. 187 (1956).
96
E.g., Omo REv. CODE § 2905.44.
97 For a partial listing, see note 95 supra.
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might well be applied to the vagrants - only unlawful acts or conduct on the part of the vagrant should be punished. In effect, the
classification "vagrant" would no longer exist; such individuals
would be treated as ordinary citizens who could be arrested at any
time that they commit an unlawful act. The vagrant is no more
likely to commit an unlawful act than the homosexual, yet the former is treated as a criminal for his mere status while the latter remains free until an unlawful act is committed. On the other hand,
it can be argued that the homosexual should receive such treatment
because he is a "sick" person and the vagrant is not.

IV. AN

EVALUATION OF THE VAGRANCY CONCEPT

Many writers have questioned the effectiveness of vagrancy
prosecutions to implement crime prevention.9 8 There are practical
difficulties and abuses in enforcing vagrancy laws, and, in addition,
they have been attacked on several constitutional grounds,9 including the inquiry here that they violate the eighth amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment clause. An examination of the existing
abuses committed by law enforcement officials should illustrate the
need for abolishing the concept of status in the crime of vagrancy.
Abuses of Vagrancy Laws

A.

Although the desired effect of vagrancy statutes no longer is to
compel the idle to work or to reduce the cost of relief for the poor,
the statutes are very definitely designed to prevent crime.1"' It is
interesting to note that vagrancy statutes are used to harass reputed
criminals and drive them out of town or to punish an individual
for committing some other crime.10' Since conduct which constitutes vagrancy might also be made criminal by other statutes, law
enforcement officials frequently have the choice between prosecuting for a specific offense arising out of certain conduct or prosecuting for vagrancy and using the conduct as evidence of the status.
98 See Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE LJ. 1 (1960); Foote,
Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956); Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203 (1953);
Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds - Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48
CALIF.
99

L. REV. 557 (1960).

Vagrancy laws have been attacked as being unconstitutional on grounds of
vagueness, restraint on freedom of movement, violation of the equal protection clause,
and double jeopardy. See notes 28-35 supra and accompanying text.
100 This function is set forth in note 6 supra and accompanying text.
101 See Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3
U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 369 (1936).
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Because it is much easier to obtain convictions for vagrancy, in some
jurisdictions vagrancy prosecutions practically replace prosecutions
for prostitution and related sex offenses."°2 It is a common practice
in some cities for the police to make regular roundups of prostitutes,
charging them with vagrancy, imposing modest fines, and then discharging them.'
In other cases, vagrancy may be used as a catchall to convict people for some other crime that cannot be proved or
for conduct that is undesirable but not criminal.'
An important use of vagrancy statutes lies in the possibility
which they afford for arrest on suspicion. The FBI Uniform Crime
Reports demonstrate that arrests on the basis of suspicion are common in this country.' 5 When law enforcement officials suspect a
person of some crime but lack enough evidence to justify an arrest,
a vagrancy charge is an excuse for making the otherwise unlawful
arrest.' This gives the police an opportunity to investigate the other
crime further or to obtain a confession from the person held as a
suspect. Vagrancy statutes often countenance this practice by providing that a suspicious person who cannot give a reasonable account of himself may be deemed a vagrant. °7 Interestingly, there
is one rare case in which a "suspicious person" law was found unconstitutional as violative of the eighth amendmenes cruel and unusual punishment clause.'0 8 However, this view was apparently not
followed in subsequent decisions.
The persons most often arrested or questioned on suspicion
include migratory workers, the poverty-stricken, and those who
have a shabby appearance because crime rates are generally higher
02

See WATERMAN, PROSTITUTION AND ITs REPRESSION IN NEW YoRK CrITY 55
(1932).
10 3 Douglas, supra note 98, at 8.
104 See, e.g., Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1953) (dissenting opinion); People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 47, 91 Pac. 997, 1000 (1907).
105 1965 FBI UNFORm CVwE REPORTS 110-11.
106 See Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious
Persons, 59 YALE UJ. 1351 (1950).
107 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 715.55(B).
10 8 Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (D.C. Cir. 1900), in which a statute
making it a crime to be a suspicious person was held to be wholly inoperative on the
grounds that it was excessively vague and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. The
1

court stated:
The suspicion of which he [the defendant] is the object is wholly undefined,

and in no manner connected with any criminal act or conduct either of the
past or that might occur in the future... Mere suspicion is no evidence of
crime of any particular kind, and it forms no element in the constitution of
crime. Id. at 234.
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among these groups,'O° but it seems questionable that a person's
appearance should be held against him by permitting such discriminatory enforcement of crime-preventive measures. Laws on the
subject of vagrancy are so broad and so vague that a policeman has
almost unlimited discretion in their enforcement."1 ' It is significant that these abuses may extend to police questioning and harassment of law abiding citizens.
Recently, a Yale University law professor became so disturbed
about the common and abusive practice of police in questioning
and detaining innocent people that he authored a public protest."'
The professor noted in his article that while taking walks late at
night, he is frequently stopped and questioned by the police who
are ready to arrest him for vagrancy upon his failure to produce any
identification. While such a practice by police may not raise eighth
amendment questions,"' it illustrates the extent to which vagrancy
laws may potentially be abused by law enforcement officials if they
choose to harass an individual who has not broken any law. The
crime-preventive nature of vagrancy laws affords police wide discretion to question persons when there is neither a visible sign of an
offense nor evidence to direct their attention to the particular individual. It is of small comfort to the humiliated, law-abiding citizen
who is arrested for vagrancy or questioned for suspicion that he will
eventually be found innocent.
B.

Vagrancy Laws and Crime Prevention
A Workable Solution

-

The effectiveness of the present concept of the crime of vagrancy in carrying out its basic purpose of crime prevention can be
seriously questioned. An examination of the common abuses by
police officials in enforcing vagrancy laws indicates that they do not
actually perform such a purpose because it is not clear that those
persons subject to arrest on vagrancy charges are necessarily potential criminals. In effect, suspicion causation has been substituted for actual causation by the creation of a criminal status for
vagrancy, a transfer which is a departure from traditional criminal
109 Douglas, supra note 98, at 5. See also Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE LJ. 1161, 1164 (1966).
110 See Note, supra note 106.
"'l Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966).
112 Such practices are more likely to raise questions concerning the fourth and fifth
amendments and also the individual's constitutional right of privacy. Douglas, supra
note 98, at 13; Reich, supra note 111, at 1169.
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theory." 8 Professor Foote in an extensive study in Philadelphia
discovered that vagrants follow several noncriminal paths; he concluded that attributing future criminality to vagrants is unfounded
in fact." 4 The professor observed:
Nor does it necessarily follow that one who is idle and apparendy without means of support will turn to criminality. When
completely down and out, he may be able to go on relief or to
obtain help from friends or relatives. Many casual workers obtain
jobs between periods of unemployment - which last as long as
any funds remain - after which they may ship out to sea, go back
to migratory agricultural labor or seasonable industrial work or
even get a job right in the skid row. A man willing to undergo
the very low standard of living of the stereotype vagrant may, like
Thoreau in Walden, work at odd jobs only to the extent necessary
to provide for his limited needs."r 5
In the final analysis, any changes of existing vagrancy laws must
be made with a consideration of both the interest of society and the
rights of the individual. Society has an interest in being protected
from the possible commission of crimes, yet the individual's freedom must be balanced against this interest. It is submitted that
repealing current vagrancy laws which punish status and enacting
new laws to punish instead specific acts when they occur serves the
interests of both society and the individual. Under this approach,
only those vagrants who actually engage in criminal conduct could
be arrested and punished. The term "vagrant" would no longer
exist because a person's status would have no significance in determining whether or not he has engaged in criminal conduct. Adherence to this traditional criminal theory serves to protect society's interest in crime protection and, at the same time, recognizes the individual's liberty through a strict reliance solely upon criminal conduct. By defining specific acts as criminal, not only would the individual be forewarned but also the frequent abuses of arrest on
suspicion or arbitrary selection would be replaced by arrests for the
actual commission of a certain act.
Repealing existing vagrancy laws and enacting new statutes to
punish certain acts rather than a present status has already proved
to be an effective method of dealing with the problem of vagrancy.
113 "A man who is idle and has no visible means of support is placed in a criminal
category, because he is deemed likely to commit a crime in order to gain a livelihood
.... ['hen the law proceeds on that basis, suspicion is the foundation of the conviction ...."Douglas, supra note 98, at 11. For a thorough treatment of the concept,
see Note, 37 N.Y.U.L REv. 102, 116-19 (1962).
114 Foote, supra note 98, at 625-27.
119 Id.at 626-27.
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England abolished the status concept of vagrancy long ago."' The
recently enacted Illinois Criminal Code embodies this idea by completely eliminating the vagrancy concept and imposing sanctions
only when there is dear proof of the commission of a specific criminal act." ' The Model Penal Code" 8 and a recent California statute 1 9 have also made significant reforms, although not to the extent
of the Illinois law.
It has been demonstrated that the crime-preventive purpose of
vagrancy laws can be achieved through the traditional criminal
theory of punishing conduct. The other purposes of vagrancy laws
- to force the idle to work and to reduce relief for the poor have become economic problems. "The economic purposes which
once gave vagrancy a function no longer exist, and the philosophy
and practices of welfare agencies have so changed relief methods
that a criminal sanction to enforce an Elizabethan poor law concept
is outdated."' 20 The notion that vagrants should be punished to
force idle wanderers to work should be discarded in place of modern welfare and rehabilitation measures. Unfortunately, according
to some authorities, vagrancy concepts linger on even in the modern
welfare system. 2' Failure to provide relief for vagrants is most
apparent in the residency requirements which characterize public
assistance laws' 2
V.

CONCLUSION

It is time that state legislatures recognize the inadequacies of
vagrancy laws as crime-preventive measures. The imposition of any
penal sanctions requires that society's interest in being protected
from the commission of criminal acts be balanced against the freedom of the individual. Since the purpose of vagrancy laws in preventing future crimes has no utility, society's interest is just as well
6
11
The

Vagrancy Act of 1824 marked the beginning of criminal punishment of
the conduct of vagrancy in England. 5 Geo. 4, c. 83. See Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937]
1 K.B. 232 (C.A.).
117 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 35-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961), repealing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 11-14, -17, -19, 28-1, 270 (1957).
118 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 (Proposed Offidal Draft 1962).
119 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647 (Supp. 1966).
120 Foote, supra note 98, at 649-50.
121 For a complete discussion of the effect of vagrancy laws on our welfare system,
see, e.g., Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 511 (1966).
12 2
Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance (pts. 1-2), 1955
WAsH. U.L.Q. 355, 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 21. See also Rosenheim, supra note 121, at
523.
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protected without vagrancy laws. As for the individual, vagrancy
laws infringe upon several of his constitutional rights. If the legislatures fail to eliminate the general vagrancy criminal concept by
enacting legislation which punishes only specific criminal acts, it is
hoped that the courts will soon find the punishment of vagrancy
unconstitutional. Because vagrancy laws frequently punish an individual for his mere status without proof that he has committed any
criminal act, there is some basis for finding, under an extension of
the Robinson v. California23 rationale, that they violate the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
GERALD E. MAGARO
123 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

